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COMMENT
THE MARIJUANA TAX AND THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The federal government has long imposed a tax upon transfers
of marijuana.' With few exceptions,2 any person wishing to obtain
the plant must procure from the Treasury Department, fill out, and
file an order form showing his name and address and those of the
proposed vendor.' Since possession or private sale of marijuana is
made criminal in all fifty states,4 compliance (or, probably, even at-
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4741-42.
2 Only a few types of transfer are exempted from the tax: transfer to a patient
from a registered physician or from a dealer pursuant to a written prescription.; ex-
portation, if in accordance with the regulations of the country-to which the marijuana
is exported; transfers to federal and state officials making purchases for the Department
of Defense, the Public Health Service, or hospitals or prisons; transfers of seeds to
any person registered under §4753; and transfers from a person registered under
§ 4753 to a registered miller. Id. § 4742(b).
Sid. § 4742(c). In addition, transfer forms will apparently not be provided unless
the transferee has registered under § 4753. See Treas. Reg. 8§ 152.66-.69 (1964). In
turn, registration under § 4753 will evidently be denied unless the proposed registrant
can show that, "under the laws of the jurisdiction in which he . . . proposes to
operate, he is legally qualified or lawfully entitled to engage in the activities for which
registration is sought." Id. § 152.23; see id. § 152.22. Consequently, anyone violating
state law, see note 4 infra and accompanying text, will find it virtually impossible to
comply with the provisions of the federal statute.
4The provisions of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act have been enacted in
all the states with the exception of California and Pennsylvania: ALA. CODE tit. 22,§§ 256-258 (1958); ALAsxA STAT. §§ 17.10.010-17.10.240 (1962); ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 36-1001 to 36-1024 (1956); ARic. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-1001 to 82-1024
(1947); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-7-1 to 48-7-8 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT.
REv. §§ 19-244 to 19-268 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§4701-4722 (1967);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§398.01-398.23 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. §§42-801 to 42-811,
42-9917 to 42-9919 (1957); HAWAII REv. LAWS §§ 52-10 to 52-39 (1955); IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 37-2301 to 37-2323 (1957); IL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 22-1 to 22-49
(1964); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3519 to 10-3550 (1956) ; IowA CODE ANN. §§ 204.1-
204.25 (1946); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-2501 to 65-2522 (1963); Ky. REv. STAT.
§§ 218.010-218.2401 (1962); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:96140:984 (1951); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit 22, §§2361-2380 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 276-306
(1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94, §§ 197-217D (1957); Micir. Comp'. LAWS
§§ 335.51-335.78 (Supp. 1952); MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 618.01-618.25 (1963); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 6844-6869 (1942); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 195.010-195.210 (1959); MoNT.
REv. CODES ANN. §§ 54-101 to 54-128 (1947) ; NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-451 to 28-472.01
(1943); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 453.010-.410 (1963) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 318-A:1-26
1964) ; N.J. REv. STAT. 24:18-1 to 24:18-49 (1937) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-7-1 to
7-51 (1953); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3300-3354 (McKinney 1954); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 90-86 to 90-113 (1958); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03-01 to 19-03-32 (1960) ;
Oxio Ray. CODE §§ 3719.01-3719.36, 3719.99 (Anderson 1953); OxLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, §§466-469A (1963); Oaa. REv. STAT. §§474.10-474.990 (1967); R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. §§21-28-1 to 21-28-66 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. §§32-1461 to 32-1495
(1962) ; S.D. CODE §§ 22.1301-22.1309 (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 52-1301 to 52-1323
(1966); TEx. PEN. CoDa ANN. art 725b (1961); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-13-1 to
58-13a-48 (1953) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4141-4163 (1959) ; V,%. CODE ANN. tit.
54, §§ 487-519 (1950); WASH. Rzv. CODE §§ 69.33.220 to 69.33.960 (1959); W. VA.
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tempted compliance 1) with the federal requirements would typically
amount to an admission of an intent to commit a crime under state
law: the names and addresses of all prospective vendors and vendees,
and of all those persons who have registered with the Treasury Depart-
ment as a "handler" of marijuana, are readily available to state and
local narcotics officials.' Although the federal registration and tax
requirements have been sustained in the past against the contention
that they violate the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrim-
ination, 7 reexamination is warranted in light of recent Supreme Court
redefinition of the scope of the privilege.'
The registration and tax provisions are enforced by a battery
of criminal penalties. Failure to register and pay the transfer tax is
punishable both by a prison sentence and a penalty tax of $100 per
ounce.9 A prison sentence is also prescribed for failure to pay the
occupational tax,' for supplying marijuana except pursuant to an
order form," for obtaining marijuana without having paid the tax,'"
and for transporting or concealing untaxed marijuana.' 3 The statute
further provides that mere possession places the burden on the de-
fendant to prove that he has duly registered 4 and that he has complied
CoDE ANiN. §§ 16-8A-1 to 16-18A-26 (1966) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.01-25 (1957) ;
Wyo. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 348-371 (1957). Although various modifications and
amendments have been made by the individual states, the prohibitory language generally
follows that of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act and makes it unlawful "for any person
to manufacture, possess, have under his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense,
or compound any narcotic drug [which is defined to include marijuana], except as
authorized in this act." UNrFORM NARcoTic DRUG Acr § 2. While California and
Pennsylvania have not adopted the Uniform Act, they have adopted substantially
similar provisions. See CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 11001-11853 (West 1964);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 780-1 to -31 (1964).
Only one state does not prohibit mere possession. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 94, § 198
(1957), outlaws possession only where there is an intent to sell.
G See note 3 mipra; note 16 infra.
6 INr. RE:v. CoDE oF 1954, § 4773, makes the names and addresses of registrants
and taxpayers available to state narcotics officials on payment of a nominal fee. In
addition, "any person" so desiring may obtain a list of the "special taxpayers" under
the occupational tax provisions. Id. § 4775. See also id. § 6701.
7 Browning v. United States, 366 F2d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1966) ; Haynes v. United
States, 339 F.2d 30, 32 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 924 (1965); Haili v.
United States, 212 F. Supp. 656, 658 (D. Hawaii 1962).
8 See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) ; Grosso v. United States,
390 U.S. 62 (1968) ; Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
9 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4741(a), 7237. The assets of one California couple
were reportedly put under a federal tax lien of $1,622,000 under § 4741. N.Y. Times,
April 29, 1968, at 61, col. 3.
1
0 
INT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, §§ 4755(a) (1), 7237.
11Id. §§ 4742(a), 7237(a).
12Id. §§ 4744(a) (1), 7237(a).
3
3
1d. § 4744 (a) (2). First offenders are subject to prison terms of 2 to 20 years
or fines of not more than $20,000, or both. Id. § 7237. The closest that the federal
statute comes to the substantive regulation of marijuana is the prohibition of conceal-
ment, transportation, or sale of marijuana by anyone knowing that it has been brought
into the United States illegally. 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964).
14 INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 7491.
19691
434 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Voi.117.432
with the order form requirements.15
In spite of the practical self-incriminatory aspects of payment of
the tax and compliance with the registration requirements, courts have
heretofore failed to discern any substantial self-incrimination prob-
lem."' In the most recent case to address itself to the issue, Leary v.
United States," the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit summarily
rejected the applicability of the fifth amendment to the federal mari-
juana statute.
The Supreme Court's decision in Marchetti v. United States,"
however, strongly suggests the opposite result. Marchetti was con-
victed of willful failure to pay the federal occupational tax on gambling
and willful failure to register as a person subject to that tax. The
Supreme Court reasoned that if compliance with the occupational tax
and registration requirement imposed on those accepting wagers would
be tantamount to admission of an intent to violate federal and state
gambling laws, the fifth amendment was an absolute defense against
prosecution for failure to comply, since such information would be
readily available to state and federal prosecuting authorities."
In so holding, the Court overruled two earlier decisions, which
had held the self-incrimination privilege unavailable because the
gambling registration requirement and occupational tax concerned only
future acts and hence involved merely speculative incrimination.m
15Id. Possession also raises the presumption that the marijuana is of illegal
foreign origin. 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964) ; see note 13 supra. These presumptions have
been generally upheld, e.g., Claypole v. United States, 280 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1960) ;
United States v. Oropeza, 275 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1960); Caudillo v. United States,
253 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1958), but one case recently held the presumption invalid.
United States v. Adams, 37 U.S.L.W. 2303 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1968).
16See cases cited note 7 supra. To a certain extent this may not be surprising,
since the refusal of the Treasury Department to allow registration without a demon-
stration on the part of the would-be registrant that his proposed activity is legal, see
note 3 supra, would make actual self-incrimination unlikely, although it seems probable
that the names of persons attempting to register would be turned over to state narcotics
officials. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 152.22 (1964), requiring investigation of would-be regis-
trants under the occupational tax provisions by the narcotics district supervisor. The
result of these various provisions, however, is that the federal statute operates to make
criminal the failure to perform an act that the regulations will usually not allow to be
performed. Stated differently, the effect of the statute and the regulation is to make
it a federal offense for a person to engage in activity prohibited by state law.
17383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rehearing denied, 392 F.2d 220, cert. granted, 392
U.S. 903 (1968) (No. 1365, 1967 Term; renumbered No. 65, 1968 Term).
18 390 U.S. 39 (1968). Marchetti was handed down along with two other deci-
sions: Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), and Haynes v. United States,
390 U.S. 85 (1968). Grosso also dealt with self-incrimination under the federal
wagering statute. Hayies found a federal firearms registration statute violated the
same constitutional privilege, since the act both outlawed certain types of firearms and
required their registration. See generally, Note, 5 SAN Drno L. R-v. 390 (1968).
19 390 U.S. at 48. The statute required those involved in gambling activities to pay
an annual occupational tax on the acceptance of wagers and a 10% excise tax on the
gross amount of all wages accepted. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4401, 4411. Each
person liable to the tax was required to register his name and address with the Internal
Revenue Department. Id. § 4412. The information thus obtained is made available
to state prosecutors by a section also applicable to marijuana tax information. Id.
§ 6107.20 Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955) ; United States v. Kahriger, 345
U.S. 22 (1953).
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Marchetti, however, found the potential for incrimination neither
speculative nor insubstantial. Compliance with the gambling registra-
tion requirement and occupational tax would significantly increase the
possibility that any past offenses would be discovered by state
prosecutors. Furthermore, compliance would tend to indicate an intent
to violate state law, thus possibly exposing registrants to subsequent
prosecutions for conspiracy. In addition, the Court saw no reason not
to apply the privilege to future acts when the danger of incrimination is
substantial."' The danger of self-incrimination as to past, present, or
future acts is just as substantial under the marijuana tax, or perhaps
even more so: the marijuana registration requires more details of a
particular highly suspect transaction.'
The Court in Marchetti also rejected a theory, embraced in an
earlier decision,' that even if the required disclosures are self-
incriminatory, the would-be gambler can avoid that aspect by ceasing
or never beginning his illegal activities.24 Since Marchetti stressed
that the "privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent
as well as the innocent and foresighted," " it cannot now be argued
that marijuana users or vendors have voluntarily waived their right not
to incriminate themselves.
The Marchetti Court distinguished another earlier decision, which
had held that the privilege was not available as a defense to prosecution
for willful failure to file a federal income tax return. In United States
v. Sullivan,"' the defendant had raised the privilege, asserting that the
information required by the tax return would have revealed his
violation of the National Prohibition Act. It was conceded that there
might have been questions within the return which violated the defend-
ant's privilege. However, the Court concluded, the vast majority
of questions could have been answered without any fear of self-
incrimination. Therefore, although the Court was willing to grant
that the defendant might have had a right to object to the privileged
questions within the return, he could not abstain from filing any return
at all.
Marchetti reasoned that, unlike the general income tax, compliance
with any of the gambling registration and tax requirements would have
been highly incriminatory.28 The Court was especially concerned with
the fact that the federal gambling requirements dealt exclusively in
" 'an area permeated with [federal and state] criminal statutes' "2
21390 U.S. at 52-54.
22 Compare INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4403, 4412, 4423, with id. §§ 4752(c), 4753,
4754.
23 Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
24 Id. at 422-23.
25390 U.S. at 51.
26 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
27 Id. at 263-64.
28 390 U.S. at 4849.
29 390 U.S. at 47, quoting Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382
U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
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and were aimed at a "'selective group inherently suspect of criminal
activities.' "30 Since the wagering statute was aimed at an inherently
suspect group, the Court concluded that the fifth amendment was an
absolute defense for failure to comply. Significantly, this conclusion
was reached despite continued recognition that the gambling tax had
a legitimate revenue raising purpose that was the government's "prin-
cipal interest." 'I
The same analysis applies with at least equal force to the marijuana
tax and registration requirements. Again, possession, use, trafficking
in, and transportation of marijuana are outlawed by a myriad of state
criminal statutes.32 Although there are in theory legitimate uses for
marijuana, such uses are rare in practice. Currently, there is only
a small industrial use for the plant," and its medical uses are limited."
In contrast, the great bulk of marijuana in the United States is con-
sumed privately for pleasure,35 an activity uniformly outlawed by state
law. The fact that there are some legitimate uses of marijuana does
not render the Marchetti rationale inapplicable, since there are also
some legitimate forms of gambling. Gambling is permitted generally
in Nevada,"0 and in many other states some forms of charity bingo are
permitted. Second, due to the abundance of statutory restrictions re-
lated to marijuana, individuals involved with marijuana are at least
as "inherently suspect" as those involved with gambling. Further-
more, there is even less of a legitimate federal purpose involved in the
marijuana tax. While at least two Supreme Court decisions have indi-
cated that the primary purpose of the gambling tax was to raise reve-
nue,3 7 the Court in the past has implied that the marijuana tax was
primarily intended not to raise revenue, but rather to regulate the
use of marijuana .3 The Treasury Department's refusal to allow most
persons to register to pay the tax strengthens this argument.39
30 390 U.S. at 57, quoting Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382
U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
31390 U.S. at 57. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in dissent, also believed that the
gambling statute had a significant revenue raising purpose, pointing out that
$115,000,000 had been raised by the tax within the past "several years." Id. at 82.
See also United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 358 (1957).
3S The statutes are collected in note 4 mspra.
33 Not more than 10,000 acres are currently devoted to legal production. This
acreage is centered in Kentucky, Illinois, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. THE MARIHUANA
PArERs 240 (D. Solomon ed. 1966).
84 Interview with Doctor Gordon French, Assistant Dean, University of Penn-
sylvania Medical School, October 8, 1968. See also PRESIDENT'S CoMMIssIoN OIN LA W
ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS
AND DRUG ABUSE 3-4 [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]; THE MARIHUANA
PAPERS xiv, xxi (D. Solomon ed. 1966).
35 T3E MARIHUANA PAPERS 259 (D. Solomon ed. 1966).
36 NEv. REv. STAT. § 463.130 (1963).
3 7 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968) ; United States v. Calamaro,
354 U.S. 351, 358 (1957).3
8See United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950).
39 Of course, refusal to allow registration does subject the transferor and trans-
feree to an additional tax liability of $99 per ounce, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4741, but
less than the total amount of tax due is actually collected. In fiscal 1962-1966, only
$418,000 was collected. TASK FORCE REPORT 13.
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The Court also found that the "required records" doctrine of
Shapiro v. United States' did not apply to gambling tax require-
ments. In Shapiro, the defendant, a wholesaler of fruit and produce,
failed to comply with section 202 (g) of the Price Control Act,41 which
required that he "keep and preserve for examination 'various records'
of the same kind as he has customarily kept . . . . " The Court
in that case denied defendant the fifth amendment privilege and upheld
his conviction for violations of the Act.
Marchetti distinguished the tax requirements on three bases.
First, the gambling provisions did not require the preservation of
records "customarily kept," but simply required gamblers to provide
information that was not likely to be related to records an individual
would have maintained. Second, the information required by the
gambling provisions had no "public aspects" 43 as had the records
required in Shapiro. Most important, the regulatory requirements at
issue in Shapiro were not vitally concerned with criminal areas of
inquiry, as were those in Marchetti.' Therefore, the Marchetti Court
refused application of the required records doctrine. The parallel
nature of the marijuana provisions leads to the same conclusion.
One possible method of escape from a fifth amendment self-
incrimination problem is to shield the information from federal and
state prosecuting authorities, as had been done in Murphy v. Water-
front Commission." In Marchetti, however, the Court declined to
follow this course, even after admitting that the paramount purpose
of the federal gambling statute was to raise revenue. The Court
reasoned that the provisions making the gambling registration in-
formation available to prosecuting authorities compelled the assumption
"that the imposition of use-restrictions would directly preclude effectua-
tion of a significant element of Congress' purpose in adopting the
wagering taxes." " Furthermore, the use-restriction would require
local prosecutors to establish that their evidence had not been tainted
by the coerced registration,47 a requirement that might "seriously"
hamper local enforcement of antigambling laws.48  Again, the mari-
juana tax seems to present an even stronger case. Considering that
the Court has in the past indicated that the paramount purpose of
the marijuana tax was not to raise revenue,49 it appears that the
40 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
41Act of January 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 202(g), 56 Stat. 23.
42 390 U.S. at 55.
43 See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 34 (1948).
44 390 U.S. at 57.
45378 U.S. 52 (1964).
46 390 U.S. at 59.
47 See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1958).
48 390 U.S. at 59.
49 See notes 38-39 supra.
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providing of incriminatory information to state prosecuting authorities
was not only "a significant element" of legislative intent in passing the
marijuana tax but the most significant element.'
One post-Marchetti decision did apply the above reasoning to void
a conviction for violating the marijuana tax laws."' The defendant
had been charged with being a transferee of marijuana without having
paid the federal tax. The federal district court found the statutory
requirements of the marijuana and gambling taxes operatively identical:
both were "directed primarily at those who are inherently suspect of
criminal activities" and both required disclosure to federal and state
prosecutors of the identities and proposed activities of those who
register and pay the taxes. 2
Surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit in Leary v. United States 5 did
not likewise appreciate the significance of the intervening decision in
Marchetti. In a per curiam refusal of a petition for rehearing, the
court distinguished Marchetti on the ground that under Texas law 6
possession of marijuana, unlike gambling, is not "per se a crime."
This, however, is an unsupportable reading of Marchetti. The
Supreme Court was not concerned with the illegality of gambling in
all circumstances; the apparent test was "inherently suspect" not in-
herently guilty. The overwhelming majority of marijuana users do
not fall within the medical and pharmaceutical exceptions of the Texas
statute, and in these circumstances it is very difficult to avoid char-
acterizing registrants and taxpayers as an inherently suspect group.
One interesting problem does arise, however, from the existence
of a parallel federal scheme for the taxation and registration of narcotics.
There are similar occupational and transactional taxes as well as regis-
tration requirements under the federal narcotics tax.56 As with mari-
juana, the information is made available to state prosecuting authori-
ties.57 Since this almost identical tax is already in force, Congress
might use it to continue the current regulation of marijuana by merely
expanding the definition of narcotic drugs to include marijuana. 8 This
roSee also the discussion in the House of Representatives, 81 CONG. REC. 5689-90
(1937) ; id. App. 1440-41 (Extension of Remarks of Congressman Buck).
51 United States v. Covington, 282 F. Supp. 886 (S.D. Ohio 1968), prob. juris.
noted, 89 S. Ct. 238 (1968) (No. 366).
52 Id. at 888-89.
53 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rehearing denied, 392 F.2d 220, cert. granted,
392 U.S. 903 (1968) (No. 1365, 1967 Term; renumbered No. 65, 1968 Term).6 4 TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 725b (1961).
55 392 F.2d at 221. For a similar interpretation of Marchetti, see Brown v. United
States, No. 25,008 (5th Cir., October 7, 1968) where it was asserted that there is no
self-incrimination problem so long as activity about which disclosure is required is
"to some extent legal."56 Except for narcotics received by a patient for treatment, it is illegal to possess
narcotic drugs unless one has registered and paid the prescribed tax. INT. REv. CoDE
OF 1954, §§ 4701-24.
57 Both taxes are covered by the disclosure provisions, id. §§ 4773, 4775, 6107.




would put users in a larger regulatory scheme that courts might con-
sider to be outside the scope of an inherently suspect group.
One federal decision has already attempted to distinguish the
narcotics tax from the reasoning set forth in Marchetti. In United
States v. Minor,9 the Second Circuit held that the self-incrimination
privilege was not available as a defense to prosecution under the
narcotics tax, on the theory that the tax was not direded at an in-
herently suspect group. The court in Minor pointed out that in
1966 there were 394,193 persons registered under the narcotics act;
430,000 kilograms of narcotics were legally imported, while only 100
kilograms of contraband narcotics were seized or purchased by federal
agents. By emphasizing the legitimate uses of narcotics for medical
and pharmaceutical purposes, the court concluded that while the
narcotics tax is certainly not " 'directed at the public at large,'" neither
is it directed towards an inherently suspect group. 0
The figures, of course, are loaded. Standing alone, all they prove
is that the federal government does not seize a particularly large
quantity of illicit narcotics. There are, in addition, figures that in-
dicate a considerably larger volume of traffic in illicit narcotics than
that recognized by the Second Circuit in Minor. In 1951, a House
Committee estimated that there were fifty thousand drug addicts in the
country, generating a 1.5 to 6 million dollar volume of business in
illegal "retail" transactions alone."' More recently, the total population
of drug addicts has been estimated at fifty-six thousand. 2 It is
doubtful that these persons obtain their drugs from legitimate dealers.'
Nevertheless, the analysis in Minor seems basically sound. Al-
though heroin has relatively few legitimate medical uses today,64 the
narcotics tax sweeps a broader path. Many, if not most of the drugs
taken illicitly are in widespread medical use.' It is hard to conceive
of the corner pharmacist as being by that fact a member of an "in-
herently suspect group."
69 398 F2d 511 (2d Cir. 1968).
0o Id. at 516. Between 1962 and 1966, nearly six million dollars was raised through
the narcotics tax. TAsK FORCE REPORT 13.
61 Most of the Nation's 50,000 dope addicts are labeled as the "criminal type"
who steal and murder to raise the $30 to $120 a week they require to keep
themselves supplied with the drug.
Hearings on H.R. 3490 and 348 Before a Subcomm. of the Honese Comm. on Ways and
Means, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1951).
6
2 TImE Ixc., THE DRUG TAKERS 54 (1965). Some sources go even further and
put the figure at close to one in every 1000 Americans. TASK FORCE REPORT 47-48.
63It is roughly estimated that 1,500 kilograms of heroin are smuggled into the
United States every year. TASK FORCE REPORT 6.
64Heroin (diacetylmorphine) and heroin hydrachloride (diacetylmorphine hydra-
chloride) no longer appear in the United States Pharmacopeia, and although it was
formerly employed, like morphine sulfate, as an analgesic, its dangers are felt to out-
weigh its medical value. See DISPENSATORY OF THE UxrrED STATES OF AmmEICA
1613-15 (25th ed. 1955); MERcK INDEX OF CHEMICALS AND DRUGS, s.v. "diacetyl-
morphine" and "diacetylmorphine hydrachloride" (7th ed. 1960).
6 See TASK FORCE REPORT 1-6.
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One thing, however, seems certain. The marijuana tax as it is
presently constituted cannot withstand constitutional challenge; in all
the relevant aspects, the registration and disclosure requirements
parallel those deemed obnoxious to the fifth amendment in Marchetti.
If the federal government desires to continue to require tax and regis-.
tration of the possession and transfer of marijuana, while making the
information thus obtained available to state prosecuting authorities,
it must merge the provisions into the larger scheme for taxation and
registration of narcotics.
